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Abstract 
The wireless devices that use radio communication are a part of day-to-day activities ranging from the garage 
opener, remote control, toys, Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), navigation system (land, air and sea), earphone,  
cordless telephone and card reader to Internet connection (Wi-Fi) in the smart phone. Most of these appliances 
are low-power and unlicensed devices, whose uses have increased over time. The unlicensed devices share the 
frequency or spectrum commons authorized by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) in each country, which 
has established rules in order to manage the spectrum. The rules allow the user to use a device without prior 
authorization, but with no protective rights. Users must accept the interference generated from other users. 
However, these uses of devices should not cause harmful interference to licensed users. Thus, the unlicensed 
devices must comply with the standard before they are marketed or imported. This paper provides a 
chronological account of how the spectrum commons developed in the USA. A survey of the literature provides 
the rationale for spectrum commons and why this concept is so important. Furthermore, the debate on each 
spectrum assignment approach and the trend of the use of spectrum commons are described. 
Keywords: spectrum commons, spectrum management, spectrum assignment, spectrum usage, historical 
approach 
Introduction 
A particular spectrum is a subset of electromagnetic waves with frequencies less than 3000 GHz which is used as 
a carrier of communication. A signal using relatively high frequencies reaches relatively short distances, but has 
a larger bandwidth . This characteristic limits the applications of the spectrum as a whole. 
Spectrum is globally used in many services such as broadcasting services (TV and radio), satellite service (long-
distance and international services), amateur services (amateur radio), maritime service (ship-to-shore, ship-to-
ship communications), mobile services (mobile phone, trunk radio, and walkie-talkie). Spectrum management 
has been implemented to control the use of spectrum and prevent harmful interference. Its management activities 
include allocation
1
 , allotment
2
 and assignment
3
. Allocation and allotment are conducted in world radio 
communication conferences, and assignments are conducted by National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs). 
Spectrum assignment has three main methods: command and control, market-based approaches, and spectrum 
commons (collective use of spectrum: CUS).  
In the earlier days of radiocommunication there were no regulations. Everyone had a right to use the spectrum 
without limitation. When a particular spectrum was filled up or overused, it created harmful interference. This 
situation was called “Tragedy of Commons”. In order to manage the spectrum and prevent harmful interference, 
NRA had to regulate the use of the spectrum through legislation such as the Radio Act. This intervention is one 
                                                            
1 allocation (of a frequency band): Entry in the Table of Frequency Allocations of a given frequency band for the purpose of its use by one or 
more terrestrial or space radiocommunication services or the radio astronomy service under specified conditions. This term shall also be 
applied to the frequency band concerned. (International Telecommunication Union – Radio Regulation 2008) 
2 allotment (of a radio frequency or radio frequency channel): Entry of a designated frequency channel in an agreed plan, adopted by a 
competent conference, for use by one or more administrations for a terrestrial or space radiocommunication service in one or more identified 
countries or geographical areas and under specified conditions. (International Telecommunication Union – Radio Regulation 2008) 
3 assignment (of a radio frequency or radio frequency channel): Authorization given by an administration for a radio station to use a radio 
frequency or radio frequency channel under specified conditions. (International Telecommunication Union – Radio Regulation 2008) 
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of the spectrum assignment approaches – command and control that imposed conditions and constraints on the 
use of the spectrum. 
The command and control approach has been used by NRA up to now; however, it does not reflect the best use 
of a spectrum because the strict regulations render the spectrum inflexible. For example, when new advanced 
technology emerges and the existing users would like to change to the new technology, they must submit the 
application to the NRA for approval prior to use, which is time-consuming. 
The development of a new spectrum management approach uses market mechanisms developed by economists. 
Economists believe that the market mechanisms will allocate the spectrum to users who value it the most.  Thus, 
a spectrum has property rights that can be exclusively used, and transferred by market-based selling or buying. In 
the primary market, the bidding or auction awards the spectrum to whoever bids the highest price. In the 
secondary market, a resale of a spectrum transfers the right of use to other parties. 
However, the market mechanisms limit access to spectrum. The use of spectrum is limited to a small group of 
users, and users can only obtain access to the spectrum by monetary means.  
The third spectrum assignment approach, spectrum commons, was developed to open up the spectrum to 
everyone. The users can share a spectrum as commons without prior authorization from the NRA. Because of the 
unlicensed nature of this scheme, its uses are increasing. Unlicensed devices share a frequency or spectrum with 
other users, which are authorized by the NRA in each country. The NRA has fixed regulations for controlling the 
use of the spectrum. The rules allow users to use their devices without prior authorization, but with no protective 
rights. They must accept any interference generated from other users. Yet the use of devices must not cause 
harmful interference to licensed users. The unlicensed devices must comply with the standard before they are 
marketed or imported. 
This paper provides a chronological account of how the spectrum commons developed in the USA
4
.  It is divided 
into five sections. Section 1 describes the era of no regulation. Sections 2, 3, and 4 describe the development of 
command and control, the market-based approach and spectrum commons, respectively. Chapter 5 concludes the 
discussion of spectrum commons. 
1. No regulation – Tragedy of commons 
The first mechanism for radiocommunication was patented by Marconi in 1897. Marconi‟s original “spark gap” 
transmitter sent signals across a whole range of frequencies. Only one transmitter could operate in a specific 
place and time in order to avoid harmful interference. In the beginning, everyone could use a transmitter. 
On March 30, 1910, the Department of the Navy attempted to regulate radio frequencies over land by passing a 
law through the Senate committee of commerce. However, the bill passed by the Senate was not accepted by the 
House of Representatives. 
Congress later passed a bill to regulate radiocommunication by authorization of the Secretary of Commerce and 
Labor and the President of the United States, which differed from the previous draft. This was the first time that 
radiocommunication over land was regulated by giving licenses to licensees, including ownership, location, 
wavelength and operating hours. However, the Act of 1912 did not give the control or enforcement power of the 
use of radiocommunication to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. 
In 1921, the Secretary of Commerce and Labor refused to renew the license of the Intercity Radio Company 
because the use of frequency would interfere with the signals of other stations, and the company filed a court 
case in 1923. 
In 1922, the Secretary of Commerce and Labor attempted to regulate radiocommunication by adding detailed 
conditions of licenses; however, it was prevented by a Court decision which interpreted the 1912 Act. 
                                                            
4 The events are taken from Coase (1959), Hazlett (1998a) and Carter (2009). 
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Consequently, the number of radio stations increased from 60 stations on March 1 to 564 stations by November 
1, 1922. 
In 1922, the government by the authority of the President set up an Inter-department Radio Advisory Committee 
to regulate the government radio stations. 
In 1923, a court decision withdrew the Secretary of Commerce and Labor‟s refusal and stated that the Secretary 
of Commerce and Labor had no authority to refuse a license and had no control over the number of stations that 
could be established. However, the Secretary of Commerce and Labor implied that he did have power to choose 
the wavelength which licensees could use. 
In 1925, the Zenith Radio Corporation obtained an unwanted wavelength from the Secretary of Commerce and 
Labor, but the company never used it. The company then decided to use other wavelengths illegally. Thus, the 
Secretary of Commerce and Labor filed a court case against the company. 
In April, 1926, the court decision was that the 1912 Act did not give the Secretary of Commerce and Labor 
power to make regulations. The Act authorized the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to issue a license only. 
Thus the licensees decided to select the power of their stations, hours to operate and the wavelength by 
themselves. This court decision created “Chaos in Broadcasting” or “a Tragedy of Commons”. 
A summary of significant events is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Period of no regulation 
Time Event 
1897 Marconi invented a radiocommunication device 
1910 First attempt to regulate radio frequency by Navy 
1912 Act of 1912 authorized Secretary of Commerce and Labor and President to regulate 
radiocommunication 
1921 Secretary of Commerce and Labor refused to renew a license 
1922 Inter-department Radio Advisory Committee set up 
1923/1926 Court rejected Secretary of Commerce and Labor attempt to regulate radiocommunication 
 
2. Heavy regulation – Command and control 
In July 1926, Congress decreed the “Joint Resolution” whereby no license would be granted for more than ninety 
days for a broadcasting station, or for more than two years for any other type of station (in order to prevent 
licensees from establishing property rights on frequencies). 
In December 1926, Congress reconvened and passed the Radio Act on February 23, 1927. The Radio Act 1927 
was enacted and established the Federal Radio Commission in order to categorize radio stations, prescribe the 
nature of the service, assign wavelengths, determine the power and location of the transmitters, regulate the kind 
of apparatus used, and prevent interference. The Federal Radio Commission had full authority to regulate the 
radio industry for commercial use, excluding censorship of the programs. 
However, the Radio Act imposed some restrictions on station programs – e.g. obscene, indecent or profane 
language was prohibited. Re-broadcasted programs should be authorized by the original station. The names of 
people paying for or sponsoring programs should be announced. Equal opportunities for legally qualified 
candidates should be given. 
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The Commission granted or renewed licenses if licensees served the public interest, convenience or necessity. 
Licenses could not be transferred without prior approval of the Commission. These rules clearly defined the 
property rights of the owner of a frequency, which could be transferred to other licensees and could be managed 
by a market mechanism. 
In 1934, the Communication Act was enacted, which founded the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). 
There were two differences from the Act of 1927: the addition of a prohibition against advertisement or lotteries, 
and additional licenses for the foreign programs that could be heard in USA. 
The Commission faced problems when renewing the licenses in 1940, 1946, 1948 and 1954 for Mayflower, Blue 
Book, Daily News and Mr. Edward Lamb, respectively. The Commission was supposed to act as “the traffic 
policeman of the ether” and used the concerns of Congress: public interest, necessity or convenience according 
to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Commission needed interpretation of these 
concerns in order to renew the licenses. 
In the command and control period, the regulators, who had previous experience of everyone over-using the 
spectrum and creating interference, made restrictions and constraints in order to avoid harmful interference and 
ensured that “Tragedy of Commons” never happened again. 
A summary of significant events is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Period of heavy regulation 
Time Event 
1926 Joint Resolution – 90 days 
1927 Radio Act 1927 enacted 
1934 Federal Communications Commission founded 
1940, 1946, 1948 and 1954 Highly regulated by authority – licensed renewal 
 
3. Auction – Market-based 
In 1951, Leo Herzel proposed that a price mechanism should be used to allocate frequency. However, this was 
opposed by Dallas W. Smythe on the ground that the price mechanism could not solve the allocation of 
frequency (a scarce resource) if there was imperfect competition. 
In 1958, a hearing concerning subscription to television, before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, was initiated and suggested that frequency licenses could be given to the highest bidders. 
While there were many arguments about the price mechanism in allocating frequency, the Commission had 
approved transferences of frequency in 1955, 1957 and 1958 in the case of selling the stations WNEW, WDTC 
and WCAV, respectively. These approvals by the Commission could imply that the private property character of 
frequency was already in place. 
In 1959, Ronald Coase proposed using market mechanisms to assign a spectrum to a user because the command 
and control method was inefficient. He suggested that the market was the most efficient mechanism to allocate 
this scarce resource. The government should issue the property right attached to a spectrum, so that the licensee 
would be able to trade, subdivide, combine or modify the property through mutual negotiation. 
In 1993, Congress permitted the FCC to use auctions for assigning frequency. The first auction was on July 25, 
1994 with the amount of 20 billion USD.  
There were many debates regarding how to define property rights, private and public property rights, ownership 
and right of use. A spectrum is public property; even the licensees do not have exclusive rights of use. Contrary 
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to private property which has ownership or exclusive rights, there is a proposal to push the FCC to turn the 
spectrum into private property (Coase, 1959). Another idea is of sharing the spectrum as open access by 
implementing a charging mechanism on the use of spectrum (E. M. Noam, 1995;E. Noam, 1998).  
Faulhaber & Farber (2002) suggested that property rights should include the high power and dedicated frequency 
which are sufficient to avoid harmful interference for defining the property rights. 
A summary of significant events is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Period of market mechanism 
Time Event 
1951 Herzel proposed a price mechanism 
1958 House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce proposed private property 
1955, 1957 and 1958 Frequency transferred of WNEW, WDTC and WCAV 
1959 Coase repeated the market mechanism proposal 
1993 Congress permitted FCC to auction 
1994 First auction of 20 billion USD 
 
4. Unlicensed – spectrum commons  
In 1938, the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) allowed unlicensed devices in Part 15 of the 
Communications Act of 1934. The unlicensed devices might emit radiowaves without previously obtaining a 
station or user authorization on the specific frequency. The use of unlicensed devices had no protection rights. 
However, unlicensed devices had to be authorized by the FCC before marketing or importation. At this time, the 
FCC allowed unlicensed devices in the medium frequency (0.3–3 MHz) and high frequency (3–30 MHz) bands. 
In December 1955, the FCC issued a Further Notice for Proposing Rule Making (FNPRM) to allow an additional 
30–890 MHz and exempted transmitters operating above 1000 MHz from field strength measurements. 
During the 1960s-1980s, the FCC amended Part 15 and allowed the use of emerging equipment such as wireless 
microphones, telemetry systems, garage door openers, auditory assistance devices, control and security alarm 
devices, and cordless telephones.  
However, the technical characteristics of Part 15 were too complex, inconsistent and outdated. Thus, a revision 
of Part 15‟s technical and administrative provisions was made in 1985. Furthermore, the FCC expanded Part 15 
to include the use of low-power devices and unlicensed spread-spectrum systems in the band of 900–928, 2,400–
2,483.5, and 5,725–5,825 MHz. 
In 1989, the FCC reclassified unlicensed devices into three categories: unintentional radiators, incidental 
radiators, and intentional radiators. The devices in Part 15 required pre-approval through an authorization 
process, prior to sale to the public, in order to comply with the technical standard. 
In 1993, the FCC allowed unlicensed personal communications services in the band of 1,910–1,930 and 2,390–
2,400 MHz. It also allowed the millimeter wave band of 59–64 GHz in 1995 and later an additional 2 GHz in the 
band of 57–64 GHz. In 1997, the FCC allowed unlicensed national information infrastructure in the band of 
5.15–5.35 and 5.725–5.825 GHz. 
In February 2002, the FCC decided to allow ultra-wideband devices with workable technical standards and 
emission restrictions without causing interference to the primary user. The use of ultra-wideband worked across 
several gigahertz bands. In July 2002, the FCC‟s Spectrum Policy Task Force sought comments from industry 
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regarding the spectrum policy. There were more than 200 comments, and commentators generally supported the 
additional frequency for the unlicensed band. The FCC allowed an additional 255 MHz in the band of 5.47–
5.725 GHz. 
In December 2002, the FCC released a Notice of Inquiry seeking feedback on allowing unlicensed devices to 
operate in the TV broadcast spectrum when it was not in use. 
The spectrum commons allows people to share frequency within the same technical constraints such as the 
frequency, power limitation and field strength. All unlicensed devices used in the spectrum commons scheme 
without protection rights must not cause harmful interference to the primary users. The development of 
unlicensed devices stimulates more innovation in both application and usage. Moreover, the unlicensed devices 
in spectrum commons increase the frequency utilization more than the two other spectrum assignment 
approaches, because there is no exclusive right to use a spectrum with spectrum commons. Everyone is able to 
use a spectrum as much as possible within the same constraints. 
A summary of significant events is shown in Table 3. 
Table 4: Period of spectrum commons 
Time Event 
1938 FCC permitted Part 15 of Communications Act of 1934 (0.3 – 3 MHz and 3 – 30 MHz) 
1955 Allowed addition of 30 – 890 MHz band and exempted receivers above 1000 MHz from field strength 
measurements. 
1985 Part 15 revision allowing addition of 900 – 928, 2,400 – 2,483.5, and 5,725 – 5,825 MHz bands 
1989 Part 15 reclassified 
1993 Allowed addition of 1,910 – 1,930, 2,390 – 2,400 MHz and 57 – 64 GHz 
1997 Allowed addition of 5.15 – 5.35 and 5.725 – 5.825 GHz 
2002 Allowed addition of 5.47 – 5.725 GHz. 
 
5. Discussion  
As seen in the above sections, the development of the spectrum assignment approach provides the characteristics 
of spectrum commons – unlicensed, free use but with constraints. According to the observations of Hardin 
(1968), spectrum commons allows everyone to use the resource until it becomes overused or overpopulated – i.e. 
the tragedy of the commons. Hardin (1968) also suggested that this problem cannot be solved by technical 
means, except by implementing the concept that „freedom is the recognition of necessity‟. This means there 
should be some constraints to control the use of resources. This reflects the basic characteristics of spectrum 
commons, i.e. unlimited access to resources but with constraints. However, there was an opposite view from 
Heller (1998) of an underused resource with multiple owners who had exclusive rights, as a new property right 
defined by the government. Heller (1998) also suggested managing this underused resource by concentrating on 
the content of a property bundle rather than on the clarity of rights. 
Regarding the frequency or spectrum as property, there are two main kinds of property: public and private. 
Heller (1999) defined the boundaries of private property that lie between the commons and the anticommons. 
Moreover, the public also claimed property when the property was physically capable of being monopolized by 
private persons, and properties themselves were most valuable when used by indefinite and unlimited numbers 
of persons (Rose, 1986). In terms of property, the spectrum commons had no exclusivity, alienation or 
management by itself (Wang, 2009). Another extreme idea came from Werbach (2004) regarding 
“Supercommons”: it had open entry and open boundaries, a white space which encouraged different business 
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models to use spectrum with impermissible interference. The concept of Supercommons is hard to implement 
and goes far beyond the spectrum commons. It cannot be implemented with the current technology at present. 
As a further interesting concept, Faulhaber (2006) and Faulhaber & Farber (2002) proposed a mix between 
market- and common-based regimes which can meet future needs. E. M. Noam (1995) and E. Noam (1998) 
suggested a similar mix with full openness of entry for all users and payment of an access fee dynamically and 
automatically by clearing-house. The access fee would depend on demand and supply conditions at access time. 
This idea has been opposed by Brennan (1998) and Hazlett (1998b) who argue that it would take a long time to 
prove the open-access concept, and that the mechanism would duplicate the efficiencies of the market and make 
the spectrum resource under-utilized. This concept of open access needs more advanced technology to 
implement and might take time to prove. 
The practical discussion regarding how to implement spectrum commons is also interesting. Benkler (1998) 
proposed a model building on non-owned components and an information infrastructure based on unlicensed 
wireless devices as commons, and suggested that the computer hardware and software market necessary to 
operate in an unlicensed environment will drive the innovation and deployment of the infrastructure. Werbach 
(2003) suggested that the regulators should make more unlicensed spectrum available through the dedicated 
open-access band, with low-power underlay and opportunistic sharing to overcome the spectrum scarcities. Lehr 
& Crowcroft (2005) provided a concept to manage spectrum commons by implementing the appropriate protocol 
including liquidity, being decentralized/distributed and adaptive and flexible. Peha (2005) suggested that a 
licensing scheme works better for use with a QoS requirement, and that an unlicensed one works better for 
wireless connection between computer and cable modems. Furthermore, Munzer (2004) argued that there would 
be issues for the intellectual in the future regarding commons and anticommons. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has reviewed the history and conceptual development of spectrum commons in the USA. The concept 
of spectrum assignment first arose after the tragedy of commons when the spectrum had been overused in 1926. 
The command and control method of implementing a heavily regulated protocol for the use of spectrum was 
introduced. Because of the lack of flexibility and inefficiency in using spectrum, the use of market mechanisms 
was introduced in order to allocate a spectrum to users who valued it the most. Creating market mechanisms for 
the spectrum by property right enables the users to trade, subdivide, combine or modify it through mutual 
negotiation. However, the argument of public and private property regarding the ownership of a spectrum, or an 
exclusive right, has continued. On the other hand, the development of spectrum commons occurred alongside the 
command and control approach by allowing unlicensed devices to share a spectrum as commons without 
protection right on some specific frequency band and with technical limitations. Under spectrum commons, users 
have non-exclusive rights to use a spectrum, creating an opportunity for everyone to use it with the same 
technical constraints. The spectrum commons stimulates innovation in application and usage through the 
development of unlicensed devices. Its use increases the spectrum efficiency more than the other two spectrum 
assignment methods. Finally, the use of spectrum commons allows everyone to use the spectrum equally and 
efficiently. 
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